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Abstract
Recently there has been a significant progress on the tower number field sieve (TNFS)
method, reducing the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in finite field
extensions of composite degree. These new variants of the TNFS attacks have a major
impact on pairing-based cryptography and particularly on the selection of the underlying
elliptic curve groups and extension fields. In this paper we revise the criteria for selecting
pairing-friendly elliptic curves considering these new TNFS attacks in finite extensions of
composite embedding degree. Additionally we update the criteria for finite extensions of
prime degree in order to meet today’s security requirements.
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1 Introduction
Let E/Fp be an ordinary elliptic curve over a prime field Fp and E(Fp) the group of Fp-rational
points whose order satisfies #E(Fp) ≈ p. Let also t = p+ 1−#E(Fp) be the trace of Frobenius
and D > 0 the CM discriminant. This is the square-free integer satisfying the CM equation
Dy2 = 4p − t2, for some y ∈ Z. We further assume that the order of the curve contains a
large prime factor r, hence #E(Fp) = hr, for some cofactor h ≥ 1. To complete the elliptic
curve notation, we denote by E[r] the group of r-torsion points on the curve, i.e. all points with
coordinates in Fp whose order is equal to r.
Let G1,G2 and GT be three cyclic groups with G1 6= G2 and #G1 = #G2 = #GT = r. An
asymmetric pairing is a bilinear, non-degenerate, efficiently computable (polynomial time) map
of the form:
ê : G1 ×G2 −→ GT.
Asymmetric pairings are defined on ordinary elliptic curves E/Fp and they are considered to be
more efficient than the symmetric ones (G1 = G2), which are defined on supersingular curves. In
the asymmetric case, the groups G1 and G2 are distinct, r-order subgroups of E(Fpk), while GT
is an r-order subgroup of the multiplicative group of the extension field Fpk . Thus, in practice,
an asymmetric pairing takes two points on the curve of order r and coordinates in an extension
Fpk and maps them via some formula to an integer of order r, hence an rth root of unity in F∗pk .
The positive integerk is called the embedding degree of the curve E/Fp with respect to r and it
is defined as the smallest positive integer such that Fpk contains all primitive rth roots of unity.
Equivalently, k is the smallest positive integer, such that all r-torsion points have coordinates
in Fpk instead of the whole algebraic closure Fp.
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In pairing-based cryptography, an elliptic curve must satisfy certain rules, in order to be
suitable for applications. In particular:
1. The prime r must be large enough, so that the DLP in G1,G2 is computationally hard.
2. The embedding degree k must be large enough, so that the DLP in GT ⊆ F∗pk is approxi-
mately as hard as in G2,G2.
3. k must be relatively small in order to ensure that operations in GT are performed efficiently.
The ρ-value defined as ρ = deg p/ log r must be close to 1, so that log r ≈ log p.
An elliptic curve E/Fp with embedding degree k and r | #E(Fp), satisfying these properties
is called pairing-friendly [FST10]. Conditions (1) and (2) are the core of security for every
pairing-based protocol. The third condition ensures that the arithmetic in the extension field
Fpk is still efficiently performed and condition (4) saves bandwidth. As ρ gets larger than 1,
the prime p, and hence Fpk gets larger. This results in large coordinates of points on the curve
which in turn affects the efficiency of operations and the memory usage requirements.
A survey on methods for constructing pairing-friendly elliptic curves is presented in [FST10].
Examples with the smallest ρ-values are obtained by the Brezing-Weng method [BW05]. These
are achieved by representing the curve parameters p, t, r as polynomial families p(x), t(x), r(x) ∈
Q[x] respectively (see Section 2 for the precise definition). In this case, pairing-friendly param-
eters are derived from the evaluation of these polynomials at some x0 ∈ Z, such that p(x0) and
r(x0) are both primes and 4p(x0)− t(x0)2 = Dy2, for some square-free D > 0 and some y ∈ Z.
Freeman et al. [FST10] suggested that pairing-friendly parameters should be chosen according
to Table 1. Although these recommendations have been followed for quite a while, recently there
Table 1: Bit size of curve parameters and embedding degrees for a desired security level.
Security Level Subgroup Size Extension Field Size Embedding Degree
in bits log r k log p ρ ≈ 1 ρ ≈ 2
128 256 3000 – 5000 12 – 20 6 – 10
192 384 8000 – 10000 20 – 26 10 – 13
256 512 14000 – 18000 28 – 36 14 – 18
has been a significant progress on reducing the complexity of the DLP in finite extensions of
composite degree. This leads us to a reconsideration concerning the sizes of the extension fields
proposed in Table 1 (3rd column), especially for composite embedding degrees k.
The complexity of the DLP in the source groups G2,G2 is O(
√
r) and it is achieved by
Pollard’s rho algorithm. In practice this means that a n-bit AES symmetric key provides an
equivalent security level as an elliptic curve whose order contains a 2n-bits prime. Contemporary
security requirements suggest that a safe choice for the security level must be larger than 128-
bits achieved by curves whose order contain a prime factor larger than 256-bits (see Table 1).
On the other hand, the complexity of the DLP in a finite extension Fpk depends on the choice
of the embedding degree k and the characteristic of the extension field. In particular, we recall
the usual L-notation given by the formula:
LN [`, c] := exp
[
(c+ o(1)) (lnN)` (ln lnN)1−`
]
, (1.1)
for some real constants ` ∈ [0, 1] and c > 0, where N = pk. In general for a finite field extension,
the NFS attack applies with complexity LN [1/3, 1.923]. This complexity still holds today for
finite extensions of prime degree. When k is composite and p has a special form, i.e. it derives
from the evaluation of a polynomial at some value, recent variants of the TNFS method, such as
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the extended TNFS (exTNFS) or special exTNFS (SexTNFS) algorithms [JK16, KB16] reduce
the complexity of the DLP to LN [1/3, 1.526].
The new improvements have a major effect on the construction of pairing-friendly curves with
composite embedding degree. An immediate consequence is that the extension field should be
larger than before and therefore the requirement ρ ≈ 1 may not be an ideal choice for composite
k any more. For example, the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves [BN05] for k = 12 were ideal for
generating a 256-bit prime and a 3072-bit extension field (i.e. ρ ≈ 1). Such parameters in the
pre-TNFS period would correspond to an 128-bit security level. After the improvements of the
TNFS method and according to Equation (1.1), an extension field of this size reaches a security
level of 110-bits. In order to achieve an extension field with 128-bit security level, one should
choose p12 around 4608-bits. Since ρ ≈ 1 in BN-curves, this results in log r ≈ 384 and hence a
mismatch between the security level in G1,G2 and the security level in GT.
In this paper we revise the criteria for constructing polynomial families (p(x), t(x), r(x))
considering the impact of the TNFS variants, presented in [JK16, KB16]. For composite em-
bedding degrees we propose the use of optimal families that are likely to provide a balanced
security level in the three pairing groups G1,G2,GT and produce pairing-friendly parameters
that are resistant to TNFS attacks. Additionally, for prime values of k we recommend the use
of polynomial families that achieve balanced security levels, but were not considered before due
to a larger ρ-value. All families presented in this paper provide a security level of 128, 256 or
512 bits. We produce numerical examples of cryptographic value obtained by our recommended
families based on the asymptotic complexity of the DLP in the finite extensions Fpk . This is
measured by the usual L-function presented in Equation (1.1) and ignoring the constant o(1).
Therefore, the scope of this paper is to provide a guideline on how to choose pairing-friendly
elliptic curves that are resistant to the new TNFS attacks.
In Section 2 we give an overview of families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves and focus on
the Brezing-Weng method [BW05] for their construction. In Sections 3 and 4 we present our
recommendations on selecting Brezing-Weng polynomial families that are suitable for producing
pairing-friendly parameters resistant to the TNFS variants. We also give numerical examples
of pairing-friendly parameters with cryptographic value for various embedding degrees. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 5, summarizing our recommendations for selecting suitable
pairing-friendly parameters.
2 Families of Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves
For a prime p, let E/Fp be an ordinary elliptic curve with trace t and order #E(Fp) = hr, for
some h ≥ 1 and a prime r. In addition, for the rest of this paper we assume that p(x), t(x) and
r(x) are non-zero polynomials with coefficients in Q.
Definition 1 (Freeman et al. [FST10]). A polynomial triple (p(x), t(x), r(x)) parameterizes a
family of pairing-friendly elliptic curves with embedding degree k and CM discriminant D if:
1. p(x) represents primes, i.e. it is irreducible, with deg p > 0 and lc(p) > 0. Additionally,
p(x) ∈ Z, for some (or infinitely many) x ∈ Z and gcd ({p(x) : x, p(x) ∈ Z}) = 1.
2. r(x) represents primes, i.e. satisfies the same conditions as p(x).
3. r(x) divides p(x) + 1− t(x) and Φk(t(x)− 1), where Φk(x) is the kth cyclotomic polynomial.
4. there are infinitely many solutions (x, y) ∈ Z× Z for the parameterized CM equation
Dy2 = 4p(x)− t(x)2. (2.1)
The ρ-value of a polynomial family is defined as the ratio ρ(p, t, r) = deg p/deg r. The third
condition of Definition 1 implies that the order of the curve has a polynomial representation
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#E(Fp(x)) = h(x)r(x), where h(x) ∈ Q[x] is the polynomial representing the cofactor. In
addition, the fact that r(x) divides Φk(t(x)−1) in Condition (3) means that t(x)−1 is a primitive
kth root of unity modulo r(x). There are three types of polynomial families depending on the
form of the polynomial f(x) = 4p(x)− t(x)2, which is called the CM polynomial.
Definition 2 (Dry lo [Dry11]). A polynomial family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) is called:
1. complete if f(x) = Dy2, for some square-free D > 0 and y(x) ∈ Q[x].
2. complete with variable discriminant (CVD) if f(x) = g(x)y(x)2, for a linear g(x) ∈ Q[x].
3. sparse, if f(x) = g(x)y(x)2, where g(x) is quadratic, non-square, with lc(g) > 0.
Using any type of family (p(x), t(x), r(x)), we can generate pairing-friendly elliptic curve parame-
ters by evaluating these polynomials at some x0 ∈ Z, such that p(x0), t(x0) and r(x0) are integers
and p(x0), r(x0) are both primes. However we can relax this strict condition and allow r(x0) to
contain a small factor s and a large prime. This extra condition increases the number of suitable
parameters that can be generated by a polynomial family. If such a x0 exists, then we obtain
an elliptic curve E/Fp(x0), with trace of Frobenius t(x0) and order #E(Fp(x0)) = h(x0)r(x0).
Examples of complete families can be found in [BN05, BW05, FST10, KSS08, MF05, TN08].
Complete families with variable discriminant are presented in [Dry11, FST10, LP09, LP12].
Finally, examples of sparse families appear in [Dry11, FK13, FK14, Fre06, FST10, MNT01]. In
this paper we will focus on the first two types of families of Definition 2, namely complete and
complete with variable discriminant families.
2.1 The Brezing-Weng Method
The most well known method for constructing polynomial families of pairing-friendly ellip-
tic curves in the sense of Definition 2 is the Brezing-Weng method [BW05]. This method
was originally applied for the case of complete families. Several modifications were presented
in [KSS08, MF05, TN08] in order to construct more examples of complete families. In [Dry11],
Algorithm 1 The Brezing-Weng method [BW05].
Input: A number field K containing the kth roots of unity and
√−D, for some square-free
D > 0 and a fixed k > 0.
Output: A complete family with embedding degree k and discriminant D.
1: Find a polynomial r(x) ∈ Q[x], such that K ∼= Q[x]/〈r(x)〉.
2: Choose a primitive kth root of unity ζk ∈ K.
3: Let t(x), y(x) ∈ Q[x] mapping to ζk + 1 and (ζk − 1)/
√−D in K respectively.
4: Compute p(x) by the relation 4p(x) = t(x)2 +Dy(x)2.
5: If p(x) represents primes, return (p(x), t(x), r(x)).
Robert Dry lo presented a variant of the Brezing-Weng method for constructing the other two
types of Definition 2. namely complete families with variable discriminant and sparse families.
The original Brezing-Weng method is described in Algorithm 1.
The number field K in Algorithm 1 was set as the lth cyclotomic field Q(ζl), for some l > 0,
such that k | l, which implies that ζk ∈ K and we also need
√−D ∈ K. The polynomial r(x) is
taken as the lth cyclotomic polynomial, in which case K ∼= Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. Then we fix t(x) and
y(x) as the polynomials representing the elements ζk+1 and (ζk−1)/
√−D in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. Once
these polynomials are determined, the calculation of the field polynomial p(x) is straightforward.
It remains to examine whether p(x) satisfies the necessary conditions of Definition 1 and if this
the case, we have a complete family of pairing-friendly elliptic curves with embedding degree k.
A more detailed description of the Brezing-Weng method for constructing complete families is
discussed in Section 3.
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In [Dry11] (Algorithm 5, p. 312), Robert Dry lo extended the Brezing-Weng method in
order to produce CVD families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves. His method works by fixing
a number field K containing the primitive kth roots of unity and taking r(x) as the minimal
polynomial of −z2, for some z ∈ K, such that z2 is a primitive element of K. The difference
between complete and CVD families is that the CM discriminant in the first case is some fixed,
non-square positive value D, while in the case of CVD families it is represented by some linear
polynomial g(x) = cx + d ∈ Q[x]. However, we can always apply the linear transformation
x→ (x− d)/c so that g(x) = x. This transformation is important as it makes the generation of
pairing-friendly parameters easier for CVD families. We give a full analysis on how to construct
this type of families via the Brezing and Weng method in Section 4.
Sparse families can also be constructed by modifying the Brezing-Weng method (see [Dry11]).
This type of families is probably the hardest one to study. This is due to the fact that it is
computationally difficult to construct CM polynomials having a factorization as in Definition 2,
namely f(x) = g(x)y(x)2, for some quadratic, non-square polynomial g(x), with positive leading
coefficient. Another hard part in sparse families is that suitable elliptic curve parameters derive
from the solutions of a generalized Pell equation and hence their generation is slightly more
complicated than in the other two types of families. We do not consider this type of families in
this paper, however several construction methods and various interesting examples can be found
in [Dry11, FK13, FK14, FST10, MNT01].
A common characteristic in all three methods is that we need to ensure that the polynomials
p(x), t(x) and r(x) are likely to extract integer values, or in other words they are integer-
valued. This condition can be tested by examining whether there exists a linear transformation
x → (az + b) such that p(az + b), t(az + b) and r(az + b) have integer coefficients. When
(p(x), t(x), r(x)) is a complete family, we can generate suitable pairing-friendly parameters by
searching for some x0 ∈ Z, such that p(x0) and r(x0) are both primes of a desired size (see
Section 3 for details). On the other hand, when (p(x), t(x), r(x)) is a CVD family, we are
searching for some x0 ∈ Z, such that g(x0) = x0 is a product of a square-free positive D times
some perfect square y2 and p(x0), r(x0) are both primes of a desired size (see Section 4 for
the precise algorithm). As stated earlier, more examples can be obtained by allowing r(x0) to
contain itself a small cofactor.
2.2 Our Contribution
Numerous examples can be found in the literature for both complete and CVD families of
pairing-friendly elliptic curves with various embedding degrees (see for example [BN05, BW05,
FST10, Dry11, KSS08, MF05, LP12, TN08]). The families in these papers focus on ρ-values
that are close to 1, in order to get the smallest possible extension extension fields Fpk that
would in turn determine the efficiency of pairing calculations in the target group of a pairing.
Unfortunately, this condition may not be ideal any more for a composite embedding degree k,
due to the improvements of the TNFS method [JK16, KB16] for extension fields of composite
degree. These TNFS variants lead to the conclusion that the previous examples we considered as
optimal, may not still provide the same security level. Consequently, the searching for suitable
elliptic curves that are ideal for implementation in pairing-based based applications is still an
open problem.
Motivated by these facts, in this paper we revise the criteria for selecting polynomial families
of pairing-friendly elliptic curves for composite and prime embedding degrees in the range 5 ≤
k ≤ 39. More precisely, the scope of this work is threefold:
1. Composite k: We construct complete and CVD families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves for
various composite embedding degrees, which are likely to generate suitable curve parameters
resistant to the new TNFS attacks presented in [JK16, KB16]. These families have larger
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ρ-values compared to previous results in order to enlarge the extension field size k log p and
hence increase the complexity of the DLP in the target group GT of asymmetric pairings.
2. Prime k: We present recommendations of complete and CVD families of pairing-friendly
elliptic curves for prime embedding degrees that have not previously appeared in the liter-
ature, due to a larger ρ-value. Since this case is not affected by the new TNFS variants,
pairing-friendly elliptic curve parameters can be chosen according to the recommendations
in Table 1. We argue that our proposals in this case are capable in producing a balanced
security level in the three pairing groups G1,G2 and GT.
3. Numerical Examples: For every recommended family with either composite or prime
embedding degree we present numerical examples of pairing-friendly elliptic curve parameters
achieving a security level of 128, 192 and 256-bits. For extension fields Fpk of composite
degree, the asymptotic complexity of the DLP in the multiplicative group F∗
pk
is calculated
by LN [1/3, 1.526] group operations achieved by the SexTNFS [JK16, KB16, EMJ17]. Since
these new attacks do not apply for prime degree extension fields, the complexity of the DLP
in F∗
pk
is computed by LN [1/3, 1.923], where in both cases N = p
k.
We argue that at present, finding families with the smallest ρ-value is not of the main concern.
The families we choose must have ρ-values such that the DLP in the extension field is resistant
to the new TNFS attacks and approximately as hard as in the source groups G1,G2. Therefore
our recommendations consist of families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves with ρ(p, t, r) ≤ 2.
3 Complete Families Revised
We give a detailed description of the Brezing-Weng method, presented in Algorithm 1, for con-
structing complete families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves. By earlier discussion in Section 2,
in order to apply this method, we first fix a number field K containing the primitive kth roots
of unity and the element
√−D, for some square-free positive CM discriminant D. By [MF05]
Algorithm 2 The Brezing-Weng method for complete families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves.
Input: An embedding degree k, a square-free D > 0, such that
√−D ∈ Q(ζm), for some m > 0.
Output: A complete family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) with embedding degree k and discriminant D.
1: Set K = Q(ζl), where l = lcm(k,m) and r(x) = Φl(x), so that K ∼= Q[x]/〈r(x)〉.
2: Let u(x) and z(x) be the polynomial mapping to ζl and
√−D respectively in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉.
3: For every i = 1, ..., ϕ(l)− 1, such that l/ gcd(i, l) = k set:
t(x) ≡ [u(x)i + 1] mod r(x) and y(x) ≡ [(u(x)i − 1) z(x)−1] mod r(x). (3.1)
4: Compute p(x) by the relation 4p(x) = t(x)2 +Dy(x)2.
5: If p(x) represents primes, return (p(x), t(x), r(x)).
we know that the element
√−D is contained in some cyclotomic field Q(ζm), for some m > 0.
Thus for a given embedding degree k and a CM discriminant D we can fix the number field K
as Q(ζl), where l = lcm(k,m). In this case we set r(x) = Φl(x), where deg r = φ(l) and such
a choice ensures that K = Q(ζl) ∼= Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. Our examples of complete families are based
on this setting, however r(x) can be also chosen as any irreducible polynomial with respect to
condition (2) of Definition 1 (see for example [BN05, KSS08, TN08]).
This analysis leads us to the modified Brezing-Weng method presented in Algorithm 2. The
complete families obtained by this algorithm have ρ-values less than 2 and particularly:










This derives from the fact that t(x) and y(x) are polynomials in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉 and hence their
degree is less than the degree of the polynomial r(x).
Remark 3. As we will see later on, sometimes it is helpful to search for polynomial families
with ρ(p, t, r) = 2, especially for small embedding degrees. Such families can be obtained by
choosing constant lifts of the polynomials t(x) and y(x) in Q[x] (see [BW05, Dry11]). In practice
this means that in Equation (3.1) we can set:




mod r(x), y(x) = y1r(x) +
[(
u(x)i − 1) z(x)−1] mod r(x),
for some lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q[x].
The conditions for the element
√−D to lie in the number field K = Q(ζl), as well as the
representation of
√−D in a cyclotomic field are given in the next lemma, which taken from
Murphy and Fitzpatrick [MF05].
Lemma 4. Let ζl be a primitive lth root of unity and D a square-free positive integer.
1. If 2 - D, 4 - D and D | l, then:
√
D ∈ Q(ζl), Q(
√
D) ⊂ Q(ζl), if D ≡ 1 mod 4√−D ∈ Q(ζl), Q(
√−D) ⊂ Q(ζl), if D ≡ 3 mod 4








Proof. See [MF05], Lemma 2.3.
Additionally, the representation of
√−D in a cyclotomic field is based on the following facts.








q, if q ≡ 1 mod 4√−q, if q ≡ 3 mod 4
whereas
√
2 = ζ4ζ8(1 + ζ4) and
√−2 = ζ8(1 + ζ4).
For every output of Algorithm 2, we need to make sure that the polynomials p(x), t(x) and
r(x) have integer coefficients, or in other words they produce integer values. If this is true, then
there exist a, b ∈ Z, such that p(x) ∈ Z, for every x ≡ b mod a. In order to generate suitable
elliptic curve parameters p, t and r, we are searching for some x0 ≡ b mod a, such that p(x0)
and r(x0) are both primes, where r(x0) has a desired size Sr. By the construction of the family
Algorithm 3 Finding suitable parameters using complete families.
Input: A complete family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) and a desired bit size Sr.
Output: A prime p, a (nearly) prime r and a Frobenius trace t.
1: Find a, b ∈ Z, so that p(x) ∈ Z, for every x ≡ b mod a.
2: Search for x0 ≡ b mod a, such that r(x0) = nr for some prime r and n ≥ 1.
3: Set p = p(x0), r = r(x0)/n and t = t(x0).
4: If log r ≈ Sr and p is prime, return (p, t, r) and D.
(p(x), t(x), r(x)), since it has a certain ρ-value, the size of p(x0) will be around ρ(p, t, r)Sr. As
stated in many papers we can relax this condition and allow r(x0) to contain a small factor
n ≥ 1. In this case r = r(x0)/n must be a large prime. This process is described in Algorithm 3.
We emphasize on the fact that the search for suitable parameters described this algorithm is
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affected by the degree of the polynomials r(x), p(x) and particularly, as deg r grows, deg p grows
as well and it is harder to find suitable candidates x0 for both polynomials. Algorithm 3 is also
affected by the size of the coefficients of these polynomials and more precisely, we need to keep
the coefficients of r(x) and p(x) rather small. This is a reason why in most papers, r(x) is set
as the lth cyclotomic polynomial (such polynomials have coefficients ±1 and 0). Consequently,
we require polynomials with relatively small degree and coefficients, depending on the security
level we are working in.
3.1 Recommendations of Complete Families
We present our recommendations of complete families aiming at security levels of 128, 192 and
256 bits. For the rest of this paper, by security level, we mean the size of the corresponding key
that is used for symmetric cryptography, such as in AES encryption scheme. Recall that our
basic concern is not to find the families with the smallest ρ-values but we are rather interested in
families with ρ-values such that the DLP in the r-order subgroups G1,G2 of E(Fpk) and in the
extension field Fpk have approximately the same difficulty.Therefore we also introduce complete
families with ρ(p, t, r) = 2. Most of the families presented here derive from the following setup:





for some i = 1, . . . , ϕ(l)− 1, where u(x) is a primitive lth root of unity in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. We will
often refer to such families as cyclotomic. The asymptotic complexity of the DLP in the finite
extension Fpk is measured by the L-notation given in Equation (1.1) (ignoring the constant o(1))
for ` = 1/3, c = 1.923, when k is prime and c = 1.526, when k is composite, according to the
improvements of the TNFS method for composite degree extension fields [JK16, KB16, EMJ17].
128-bit security level.
In Table 2 we give our recommendations for complete families that are likely to achieve a 128-bit
security level in the source groups G1,G2 of a pairing and in the extension field Fpk . In this
Table 2: Cyclotomic Complete families at 128-bit security level.
k l deg r D i ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
7 7 6 7 3 1.6667 {1, 4} mod 7 2987 137
7 21 12 3 3 1.6667 1 mod 3 2987 137
7 28 12 1 16 1.5000 1 mod 2 2688 131
10 20 8 1 2 1.7500 1 mod 2 4480 129
10 20 8 5 18 1.7500 {0, 4, 6} mod 10 4480 129
10 30 8 15 3 1.7500 {1, 3, 6, 13} mod 15 4480 129
10 40 16 2 36 1.8750 0 mod 4 4800 133
11 33 20 3 12 1.2000 1 mod 3 3379 144
11 33 20 3 24 1.3000 {1, 2} mod 3 3661 149
12 12 4 3 1 1.5000 1 mod 3 4608 130
12 24 8 2 2 1.7500 1 mod 2 5376 139
case the prime r is around 256-bit long. On the other hand the asymptotic complexity of the
DLP in Fpk implies that k log p ≈ 2530 when k is prime and k log p ≈ 4352 when k is composite.
We observe that the best balance in Table 2 for a composite embedding degree is achieved by
the pairs (k, ρ) = (10, 1.75) and (12, 1.5). In the first case, for a prime r around 256-bits, the
size of the extension field Fp10 is around 4480-bits, while for k = 12, we get an extension field
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around 4608-bits. For k = 10, there are three families with ρ(p, t, r) = 1.75 in Table 2, with CM
discriminants D ≡ 1, 5 and 15. In Example 5 we describe how to extract the complete family
for k = 10, D = 5 and ρ(p, t, r) = 1.75 using Table 2.
Example 5. By Table 2, we set the number field K = Q(ζ20). Thus we take r(x) as the 20th
cyclotomic polynomial:
r(x) = Φ20(x) = x
8 − x6 + x4 − x2 + 1 with deg r = 8
and u(x) = x is a primitive 20th root of unity in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. By Lemma 4, the representation
of
√−5 in K = Q(ζ20) is given by
√−5ζ4(ζ5−ζ45 )(ζ25−ζ35 ) and in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉 by the polynomial:
z(x) ≡ [u(x)5 (u(x)4 − u(x)16) (u(x)8 − u(x)12)] mod r(x) ≡ (−2x7 + x5 − 2x3) mod r(x).
For i = 18 in Algorithm 2 we obtain:
t(x) ≡ (−x6 + x4 − x2 + 2) mod r(x) and y(x) ≡ 1
5
(−2x7 + 3x5 − 3x3 + 2x) mod r(x).











4x14 − 7x12 + 11x10 − 11x8 − 9x6 + 13x4 − 16x2 + 20) .
The polynomial p(x) is integer-valued when evaluated at integers satisfying x ≡ {0, 4, 6} mod 10.
We conclude that the polynomial triple (p(x), t(x), r(x)) represents a complete family of elliptic
curves with embedding degree k = 10 , CM discriminant D = 5 and ρ-value:







All examples of Table 2, as well as in all tables of this section are obtained in the same way.
The remaining examples of complete families in Table 2 also provide an acceptable balance
between the security level in the source groups G1,G2 and Fpk , but with a slightly larger exten-
sion field. An optimal balance in the prime embedding degree case is achieved by families with
k = 5 and ρ(p, t, r) = 2. We can obtain such families by applying Algorithm 2 and considering
constant lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q for the polynomials t(x) and y(x), as stated in Remark 3. Examples
Table 3: Cyclotomic Complete families at 128-bit security level with lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q and ρ = 2.
k l deg r D i t1 y1 x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
5 15 8 3 3 1 1 {0, 2} mod 3 2560 128
5 20 8 1 12 1 0 0 mod 2 2560 128
5 20 8 5 4 1 0 {0, 2, 8} mod 10 2560 128
8 8 4 1 1 1 0 0 mod 2 4096 124
8 8 4 2 3 1 0 1 mod 2 4096 124
8 24 8 3 9 1 −1 1 mod 3 4096 124
9 9 6 3 5 1 1 2 mod 3 4608 130
9 36 12 1 4 1 0 0 mod 2 4608 130
9 72 24 2 8 1 0 0 mod 2 4608 130
of complete families with embedding degrees 5, 8 and 9, aiming at a security level of 128-bits
in the extension field are presented in Table 3. This are the first examples of families in the
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literature with ρ(p, t, r) = 2. Note that when k = 5, and log r = 256, the extension field Fp5
is approximately 2560-bits, which is note very large, although ρ = 2 is far from the ideal case.
On the other hand, for the case k = 8, the best examples so far had ρ(p, t, r) = 1.5 resulting in
extension fields of size around 3072-bits. We argue that the optimal case for k = 8 should be
revised and use families with ρ(p, t, r) = 2 yielding extension fields around 4096-bits. Finally, we
can also reach an extension field with 128-bit security level by choosing k = 9 and ρ(p, t, r) = 2,
where 9 log q ≈ 4608. These facts justify our earlier claim, that finding families with the smallest
ρ-value should not be our main concern at this point.
192-bit security level.
Our recommendations for complete families that achieve a 192-bit security level in the three
pairing groups G1,G2 and GT are presented in Table 4. Clearly there is a larger variety of
available families to choose from in this case. The size of the prime r dividing the order of
the curve is now 384-bits. The asymptotic complexity of the DLP in the extension field Fpk
Table 4: Cyclotomic Complete families at 192-bit security level.
k l deg r D i ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
11 11 10 11 1 1.8000 {1, 4, 8, 9} mod 11 7603 202
11 11 10 11 8 1.6000 1 mod 11 6758 193
11 33 20 3 6 1.7000 {1, 2} mod 3 7181 197
11 33 20 3 18 1.8000 1 mod 3 7603 202
11 33 20 3 27 1.6000 1 mod 3 6758 193
11 44 20 1 28 1.7000 1 mod 2 7181 197
13 39 24 3 3 1.3333 1 mod 3 6656 191
13 39 24 3 18 1.5000 1 mod 3 7488 201
13 39 24 3 30 1.4167 {1, 2} mod 3 7072 196
13 52 24 1 30 1.4167 1 mod 2 7072 196
16 16 8 2 1 1.7500 1 mod 2 10752 185
18 72 24 2 4 1.5833 1 mod 2 10944 186
20 20 8 1 1 1.5000 1 mod 2 11520 190
20 60 16 3 3 1.6250 {1, 2} mod 3 12480 196
21 21 12 3 1 1.3333 1 mod 3 10752 185
21 21 12 3 2 1.5000 {1, 2} mod 3 12096 194
22 44 20 1 2 1.3000 1 mod 2 10982 187
22 44 20 1 26 1.5000 1 mod 2 12672 198
22 66 20 3 3 1.4000 1 mod 3 11827 192
24 24 8 3 1 1.2500 1 mod 3 11520 190
26 78 24 3 27 1.1667 1 mod 3 11648 191
27 27 18 3 1 1.1111 1 mod 3 11520 190
implies that for the prime embedding degree case we must have k log p ≈ 6670, while in the
composite case we have k log p ≈ 11670. The best balance when k is prime can be obtained
by the pairs (k, ρ) = (11, 1.6) and (13, 1.3333). In the first case, p11 is 6758-bit long and we
present two such families in Table 4 with CM discriminant D = 3 and 11. In the second
case, p13 has a size around 6656-bits and there is one family for CM discriminant D = 3 in
Table 4. For composite embedding degrees there are even more optimal families, for example
(k, ρ) = (20, 1.5), (22, 1.4), (26, 1.1667). These examples provide an extension field of size 11500
to 11900-bits, with security level around 192-bits, according to the asymptotic complexity given
by Equation (1.1). The rest of the families in Table 4 also provide a nicely balanced security
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level in all pairing-groups. An optimal balance for composite embedding degrees can be also
Table 5: Cyclotomic Complete families at 192-bit security level with lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q and ρ = 2.
k l deg r D i t1 y1 x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
15 15 8 3 4 1 1 0 mod 3 11520 190
15 15 8 15 7 1 1 {11, 14} mod 15 11520 190
15 60 16 1 4 1 0 0 mod 2 11520 190
15 60 16 5 4 1 0 {0, 4, 6} mod 10 11520 190
16 16 8 2 1 1 1 1 mod 2 12288 195
16 16 8 1 1 1 0 0 mod 2 12288 195
16 48 16 3 33 1 1 1 mod 3 12288 195
achieved with complete families having ρ(p, t, r) = 2. For families with this property, we need
to take constant lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q, in order to reach an 192-bit security level in the extension field
Fpk . We present such examples in Table 5, for k = 15, 16.
256-bit security level.
For a 256-bit security level, the extension field Fpk gets even larger. Today’s requirements
indicate that the optimal security level is around 128-bits corresponding to an AES symmetric
key. Larger security levels, such as 192 and 256-bits, are for future reference. Additionally,
Table 6: Cyclotomic Complete families at 256-bit security level.
k l deg r D i ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
17 51 32 3 24 1.5000 1 mod 3 13056 252
17 51 32 3 42 1.5625 {1, 2} mod 3 13600 256
17 68 32 1 8 1.5625 1 mod 2 13600 256
19 57 36 3 6 1.3889 {1, 2} mod 3 13511 256
19 57 36 3 24 1.3333 1 mod 3 12971 252
19 76 36 1 44 1.3889 1 mod 2 13511 256
23 69 44 3 3 1.1818 1 mod 3 13916 259
23 69 44 3 48 1.1364 {1, 2} mod 3 13382 255
23 92 44 1 48 1.1364 1 mod 2 13382 255
25 75 40 3 12 1.8500 {1, 2} mod 3 23680 255
25 100 40 1 12 1.8500 1 mod 2 23680 255
26 78 24 3 9 1.8333 1 mod 3 24405 258
26 104 48 2 4 1.7917 1 mod 2 23851 255
26 104 48 2 44 1.8333 1 mod 2 24405 258
27 27 18 3 7 1.7778 1 mod 3 24576 258
27 108 36 1 4 1.7222 1 mod 2 23808 255
28 28 12 1 3 1.6667 1 mod 2 23893 256
30 30 8 3 1 1.5000 1 mod 3 23040 252
30 60 16 5 34 1.6250 5 mod 10 24960 260
33 33 20 3 14 1.4000 1 mod 3 23654 255
34 68 32 1 6 1.4375 1 mod 2 25024 260
34 102 32 3 39 1.3750 1 mod 3 23936 256
39 39 24 3 1 1.1667 1 mod 3 23296 253
39 39 24 3 2 1.2500 {1, 2} mod 3 24960 260
the prime r that represents the order of the three pairing groups G1,G2 and GT has now a
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size of 512-bits. Complete families at this security level should generate extension fields Fpk
around 13500-bits in the prime case and 23900-bits in the composite case. We give a list
of optimal complete families in Table 6. The best balance in the prime case is achieved by
the pairs (k, ρ) = (17, 1.5625), (19, 1.3889) and (23, 1.1364). On the other hand, for composite
embedding degrees we get the best balance by the families with (k, ρ) = (28, 1.6667), (34, 1.3750).
Finally, in Table 7 we demonstrate complete families with embedding degrees k = 13 and 24
Table 7: Cyclotomic Complete families at 256-bit security level with lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q and ρ = 2.
k l deg r D i t1 y1 x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
13 39 24 3 12 1 1 0 mod 3 13312 254
13 52 24 1 4 1 0 0 mod 2 13312 254
13 52 24 13 4 1 0 {0, 2, 4, 8, 18, 22, 24} mod 26 13312 254
24 24 8 1 1 1 0 0 mod 2 24576 258
24 24 8 2 1 1 0 0 mod 4 24576 258
24 24 8 3 17 1 1 1 mod 3 24576 258
24 24 8 6 7 1 0 2 mod 12 24576 258
and ρ(p, t, r) = 2. These are suitable for generating the desired extension fields, where the DLP
is resistant to the new variants of the TNFS attacks.
Non-cyclotomic families.
More complete families can be constructed by choosing the polynomial r(x) to be other than a
cyclotomic polynomial, with respect to condition (2) of Definition 1. We refer to this type of
complete families as non-cyclotomic. Such examples appear in [KSS08, TN08], which however
need to be updated as the proposed families were produced in the pre-TNFS period. The
difficult part when constructing non-cyclotomic families is the choice of the polynomial r(x) and
the primitive kth root of unity u(x) ∈ Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. Strategies for determining such polynomials
can be found in [FK14, KSS08, LP09, LP12, TN08]. However the problem is that the coefficients
of the polynomials r(x) and p(x) might get very large affecting the process of generating suitable
curve parameters.
The most famous non-cyclotomic complete family is due to Barreto and Naehrig’s BN-family.
It has embedding degree k = 12, CM discriminant D = 3 and ρ(p, t, r) = 1 and it is represented
by the polynomials:
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1, t(x) = 6x2 + 1, p(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x+ 1,
where u(x) = 6x2 is a primitive 12th root of unity in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. This example was ideal for
a security level of 128-bits in the pre-TNFS period, since it produces elliptic curve parameters
with ρ = 1. More precisely, for a 256-bit prime r, it produces an extension field of 3072-bit. Due
to the recent improvements of the TNFS method, the security level in Fp12 only reaches 110-bits.
Therefore we need to consider larger extensions fields and particularly of size 12 log p ≈ 4608
leading to families with ρ(p, t, r) = 1.5 (see for example our recommendation in Table 2). The
next example is produced by Barreto and Naehrig’s setup.
Example 6. For l = k = 12 and D = 3, set:
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1
u(x) = 6x2 =⇒ t(x) ≡ [u(x)7 + 1] mod r(x) = −6x2 + 1
p(x) = 1728x6 + 2160x5 + 1548x4 + 756x3 + 240x2 + 54x+ 7
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The ρ(p, t, r) = 1.5 and all polynomials have integer coefficients.
Kachisa et al. [KSS08] presented several examples on non-cyclotomic families, that need to
be updated. We give alternatives to these examples, based on the polynomials r(x) and u(x)
presented in [KSS08].
Example 7. For l = k = 16, D = 1 and set:
r(x) = x8 + 48x4 + 625
u(x) = (−2x7 + 29x3)/875 =⇒ t(x) ≡ [u(x)3 + 1] mod r(x) = (−2x7 + 29x3 + 1) /875
p(x) =
(
x14 − 22x11 + 48x10 + 125x8 − 1112x7 + 625x6 + 6000x4 − 12938x3 + 78125) /24500
Then ρ(p, t, r) = 1.75 and all polynomials are integer-valued when x ≡ {25, 45} mod 70.
This family is suitable for producing extension fields of size 16 log p = 10752-bits, providing a
security level of 185-bits, for primes r around 384-bits. The polynomials r(x) and u(x) were
used in [KSS08] to construct a complete family with ρ(p, t, r) = 1.25, which does not fall into
any of the three security levels we consider.
3.2 Numerical Examples
In Table 8 we give a list of numerical examples obtained by selected complete families presented
in this section, for security levels of 128, 192 and 256-bits. Recall that in order to generate
suitable elliptic curve parameters, given a complete family of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, we
apply Algorithm 3. The column ”x0” refers to the integer input for the polynomials p(x), t(x)
and r(x). The column ”n” on the other hand denotes the possible cofactor contained in r(x0), in
which case by Algorithm 3 we set r = r(x0)/n. As stated earlier, this factor nmight be helpful in
some cases as it further increases the size of the extension field. In the final column we measure
the security level provided by the constructed extension field, using Equation (1.1) and ignoring
the constant o(1).
For instance, recall the complete family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) with k = 10 and D = 5 presented in
Example 5. In order to obtain integer triples, these polynomials must be evaluated at some x0,






t(x0) = − 10214814427560271006181812182933762983830315056204066240398
with ρ = 1.7461. Additionally, the prime r(x0) is 256-bits and the extension field Fp10 has size
4470-bits, corresponding to a security level of 129-bits, according to Equation (1.1). Therefore,
these parameters are ideal for a 128-bit security level. The rest of the examples in Table 8 are
obtained by the families of this section in the same way.
Recall also that the search for suitable x0 is affected by both the degree of the polynomial
r(x), as well as by the size of its leading coefficient. In particular, this search is performed by
choosing at random x0 ∈ Z such that:
deg r · log x0 + log(lc(r)) ≈ security level, (3.2)
where lc(r) is the leading coefficient of r(x). Note that when r(x) = Φl(x) in cyclotomic families,
then log(lc(r)) = 0. The security level in the r-order subgroups G1,G2 is taken as log r/2. In
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Equation (3.2) it is clear that deg r affects the search and thus, it should not be too large. For
example, for a 128-bit security level we have considered families with deg r ≤ 24. For 192-bit
security level our families have deg r ≤ 24 and for 256-bit security level we set the restriction
deg r ≤ 48. On the other hand, the security level in the extension field Fpk is measured by the
Table 8: Numerical examples of pairing-friendly parameters from selected complete families.
Source k D x0 n log r k log p ρ Lpk [1/3, c]
Table 3 5 3 4467952995 ≡ 0 mod 3 1 256 2560 2.0000 128
Table 3 5 5 4339430220 ≡ 0 mod 10 1 256 2550 1.9922 128
Table 3 5 1 5335509292 ≡ 0 mod 2 5 256 2575 2.0117 129
Table 2 7 1 2713075 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 256 2674 1.4922 131
Table 3 8 1 68654621113518002124 ≡ 0 mod 2 113 256 4200 2.0508 125
Table 3 8 2 60985336081474503491 ≡ 1 mod 2 82 256 4184 2.0430 125
Table 3 8 3 8318694697 ≡ 1 mod 3 193 256 4216 2.0586 126
Table 2 10 1 4327482431 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 256 4460 1.7422 129
Table 2 10 5 4658060020 ≡ 0 mod 10 1 256 4470 1.7461 129
Table 2 10 15 4506234361 ≡ 1 mod 15 1 256 4470 1.7461 129
Table 2 12 3 19476673796408493595 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 256 4584 1.4922 130
Exam. 6 12 3 7968144943122361485 1 256 4644 1.5117 131
Table 4 11 3 609856 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 384 6743 1.5964 192
Table 4 13 3 66427 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 384 6643 1.3307 191
Table 5 15 3 663228522589779 ≡ 0 mod 3 751 384 11805 2.0495 192
Table 4 21 3 4371055696 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 384 12054 1.4948 194
Table 4 22 3 602956 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 384 11792 1.3958 192
Table 4 26 3 66211 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 384 11596 1.1615 191
Table 7 13 13 3188926 ≡ 0 mod 26 1 512 13455 2.0215 255
Table 7 24 2 19228544116597719574 ≡ 2 mod 4 1 512 24576 2.0000 258
Table 6 26 3 2710936 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 512 24388 1.8320 258
Table 6 27 3 389679094 ≡ 1 mod 3 1 512 24597 1.7793 258
Table 6 28 1 7238566404315 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 23856 1.6641 255
Table 6 39 3 3305782 ≡ 1 mod 3 157 512 23556 1.1797 254
L-notation of Equation (1.1), namely Lpk [1/3, c], where c = 1.923 when k is prime and c = 1.526
when k is composite. In general we want Lpk [1/3, c] ≈ log r/2. Table 8 is just an instance of a
few numerical examples . There are a lot of different triples (p, t, r) that can be produced by
applying the techniques described in this section. Furthermore, we emphasize on the fact that
the easiest way to generate pairing-friendly elliptic curve parameters is to use complete families,
rather than the other two types of Definition 2.
4 CVD Families Revised
By Definition 2, the CM polynomial f(x) = 4q(x)− t(x)2 is equal to the product of some linear
term g(x) = cx+ d times a perfect square y(x)2. As stated in Section 2 we can always apply on
g(x) a linear transformation x → (x − d)/c in order to obtain g(x) = x. The difference in the
case of CVD families is that the CM discriminant is not constant and predefined as in complete
families, but it is represented by the linear term g(x) = x. Thus for a fixed embedding degree
k we need to find a number field K containing both the primitive kth roots of unity and the
element
√−x.
According to Dry lo [Dry11], we can apply a modified version of the Brezing-Weng method,
introduced in Algorithm 2, for the case of CVD families. This modified version is presented in
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Algorithm 4. We set K = Q(ζl) and r(x) = Φl(x), for some l > 0, with k | l and then search for a
polynomial z(x) ∈ Q[x]/〈r(x)〉, such that −z(x)2 ≡ x mod r(x). This search is easy when r(x) is
the lth cyclotomic polynomial (see for example [Dry11]). However if we set r(x) as any irreducible
polynomial in Q[x], satisfying condition (2) of Definition 1, the search is harder, especially as
deg r grows. A few such examples are also presented in [Dry11]) (see also [LP09, LP12], for
additional examples). Once z(x) is determined, then we proceed according to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 4 The Brezing-Weng method for CVD families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves.
Input: An embedding degree k.
Output: A CVD family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) with embedding degree k.
1: Set K = Q(ζl), where k | l and r(x) = Φl(x), so that K ∼= Q[x]/〈r(x)〉.
2: Find a polynomial z(x) ∈ K, such that −z(x)2 ≡ x mod r(x).
3: Let u(x) be the polynomial mapping to ζl in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉.
4: For every i = 1, ..., ϕ(l)− 1, such that l/ gcd(i, l) = k set:
t(x) ≡ [u(x)i + 1] mod r(x) and y(x) ≡ [(u(x)i − 1) z(x)−1] mod r(x). (4.1)
5: Compute p(x) by the relation 4p(x) = t(x)2 + xy(x)2.
6: If p(x) represents primes, return (p(x), t(x), r(x)).
The only thing that changes is the construction of the field polynomial in Equation (4.1). The
families produced by Algorithm 4 have generally ρ-values:









By Remark 3, if we wish to obtain a CVD family with ρ(p, t, r) = 2 we need to consider constant
lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q for the polynomials t(x) and y(x) respectively in step (3) of Algorithm 4.
As in complete families, the outputs of Algorithm 4 are potential CVD families, since we need
to make sure that the constructed polynomials are integer-valued. Thus we need to search for
a, b ∈ Z, such that p(x) ∈ Z, for every x ≡ b mod a. Then, in order to generate pairing-friendly
parameters using this type of families, we are searching for x0 ∈ Z, such that p(x0) is prime and
r(x0) is nearly prime, i.e. it contains a small factor n ≥ 1. An additional condition in this case
is that g(x0) must be equal to the product of some square-free D > 0 times a perfect square y
2.
We can perform this search by setting x0 = Dy
2 and vary D, y until we hit a valid pair (D, y),
for which g(x0) = Dy
2. This procedure is described in Algorithm 5 (see also Paragraph 4.2 for
generating suitable elliptic curve parameters using CVD families). Once again this process is
Algorithm 5 Finding suitable parameters using CVD families.
Input: A CVD family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) and a desired bit size Sr.
Output: A prime p, a (nearly) prime r and a Frobenius trace t.
1: Find a, b ∈ Z, so that p(x) ∈ Z, for every x ≡ b mod a.
2: Search for x0 ∈ Z of the form x0 = Dy2, with x0 ≡ b mod a, such that r(x0) = nr for some
prime r and n ≥ 1.
3: Set p = p(x0), r = r(x0)/n and t = t(x0).
4: If log r ≈ Sr and p is prime, return (p, t, r) and D.
affected by the degree of the polynomial r(x), as well as the size of its coefficients (especially
the leading coefficient).
In general, CVD families are a nice choice for applications that require large and flexible CM
discriminants. Although there is no particular attack on elliptic curves with small discriminants,
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in [EMJ17] it is recommended to use curves with large D. However we emphasize on the fact that
the values for D to be tested must be relatively small (e.g. D < 1010), in order to apply the CM
method for constructing elliptic curves efficiently. Another option for flexible CM discriminants
is to use sparse families (see for example [Dry11, FK14, FST10]), but in this case the procedure
of generating suitable parameters is slightly more complicated.
4.1 Recommendations of CVD Families
We now present our recommendations of CVD families at the usual security levels of 128, 192
and 256-bits. As stated in the case of complete families, our basic concern is to introduce CVD
families with ρ-values such that the DLP in the r-order subgroups G1,G2 of E(Fpk) and in the
extension field Fpk have approximately the same difficulty. Therefore we also introduce CVD
families with ρ(p, t, r) = 2, that have not been considered before. The proposed CVD families
are mainly cyclotomic families obtained by the following setup:




mod r(x), z(x) = x
l/2+1
2 , (4.2)
for i = 1, . . . , ϕ(l) − 1, where u(x) and z(x) represent the primitive lth root of unity and the
element
√−x in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉 respectively. In addition, by the choice of z(x) in Equation (4.2),
we get that l must be an even, positive integer. This setup was first considered by Dry lo [Dry11],
however his families are aiming for the smallest ρ-values for each embedding degree. In addition
we also introduce a few non-cyclotomic CVD families for embedding degrees that do not appear
in the cyclotomic case. For every proposed family we measure the asymptotic complexity of the
DLP in the finite extension Fpk by using the L-notation of Equation (1.1), for l = 1/3, c = 1.923,
when k is prime and c = 1.526, when k is composite. This follows from the recent improvements
of the TNFS methods for composite degree extension fields [JK16, KB16, EMJ17].
128-bit security level.
Examples of cyclotomic CVD families for a 128-bit security are presented in Table 9. Recall
that in this case the prime r = #G1 = #G2 is 256-bits, while the extension field must be
k log p ≈ 2530, when k is prime and k log p ≈ 4352, when k is composite. The best examples in
Table 9: Cyclotomic CVD families at 128-bit security level.
k l deg r i ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
7 14 6 8 1.5000 1 mod 2 2688 131
9 18 6 10 1.8333 1 mod 2 4224 126
10 10 4 1 1.7500 1 mod 2 4480 129
11 22 10 6 1.2000 1 mod 2 3379 144
14 14 6 1 1.5000 1 mod 2 5376 139
this case are achieved by the pairs (k, ρ) = (7, 1.5) and (10, 1.75). In the first case the extension
field Fpk is 2688-bits, while in the second case, it is 4480-bits. The rest of the examples produce
a slightly larger extension field, but still close to the optimal balanve. We describe how the first
CVD family of Table 9 is obtained in the following example.
Example 8. We set the number field K = Q(ζ14). Hence the polynomial r(x) is the lth
cyclotomic polynomial:
r(x) = Φ14(x) = x
6 − x5 + x4 − x3 + x2 − x+ 1 with deg r = 6
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and u(x) = x is a primitive 14th root of unity in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. By Equations (4.2), we set
z(x) = x4 so that
z(x)2 = x8 ≡ −x mod r(x) =⇒ z(x) ≡ √−x mod r(x).
For i = 8 in Algorithm 4 we obtain:
t(x) ≡ (−x+ 1) mod r(x) and y(x) ≡ (x4 + x3) mod r(x).
Since gcd(i, l) = 2, we get that k = 7, by step (4) of Algorithm 4. For the field polynomial p(x)











x9 + 2x8 + x7 + x2 − 2x+ 1)
and it is integer valued for every integer x ≡ 1 mod 2. We then conclude that the polynomial
triple (p(x), t(x), r(x)) represents a CVD polynomial family of pairing-friendly elliptic curves
with embedding degree k = 7 and ρ-value:







All examples in Table 9, as well as all examples in the tables to follow are obtained in an
analogous way.
As we did in Section 3, we also introduce several CVD families with ρ(p, t, r) = 2. Such
families can be obtained by applying Algorithm 4 and considering constant lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q for
the polynomials t(x) and y(x). CVD families with this ρ-value have not considered before,
Table 10: Cyclotomic CVD families at 128-bit security level with lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q and ρ = 2.
k l deg r i t1 y1 x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
5 10 4 6 1 0 0 mod 2 2560 128
9 18 6 4 1 0 0 mod 2 4608 130
however we argue that they are likely to offer a nicely balanced security level in the three
pairing groups. We give two such examples in Table 10 for embedding degrees 5 and 9, which
produce an extension field Fpk of 2560-bits in the first case and 4608-bits in the second case.
Although ρ = 2 in these families, the corresponding extension fields are not sol large that we
cannot handle. Both in complete and CVD families we see that the potentially ideal families
are limited when working at an 128-bit security level. However, each family is likely to produce
a large number of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, when evaluated at appropriate integers. More
families can be found when working at higher security levels, such as 192 or 256-bits as we will
see in the next paragraphs.
192-bit security level.
Our examples for the case of CVD families that produce an optimal security level in the three
pairing groups G1,G2 and GT are listed in Table 11. For an 192-bit security level recall that
the prime r has a size of 384-bits and the extension field Fpk should be around 6670-bits for
prime embedding degrees and 11670-bits for composite values of k, in order for the DLP to be
resistant against TNFS attacks. The best balance in the prime case is obtained by the pairs
(k, ρ) = (11, 1.6) and (13, 1.3333) and for the composite case by the pairs (k, ρ) = (22, 1.4) and
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Table 11: Cyclotomic CVD families at 192-bit security level.
k l deg r i ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
11 22 10 2 1.5000 1 mod 2 6336 188
11 22 10 8 1.6000 1 mod 2 6758 193
11 22 10 14 1.7000 1 mod 2 7181 197
13 26 12 2 1.4167 1 mod 2 7072 196
13 26 12 8 1.3333 1 mod 2 6656 191
18 18 6 5 1.6667 1 mod 2 11520 190
22 22 10 1 1.3000 1 mod 2 10982 187
22 22 10 7 1.4000 1 mod 2 11827 192
22 22 10 13 1.5000 1 mod 2 12672 198
25 50 20 26 1.3500 1 mod 2 12960 200
26 26 12 7 1.1667 1 mod 2 11648 191
(26, 1.1667). The remaining examples in Table 11 also achieve a security level in the extension
field close to 192 bits.
We also introduce an example for k = 15 with ρ(p, t, r) = 2, which is obtained by taking
constant lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q for the polynomials t(x) and y(x). The extension field Fpk in this case
has size around 11520-bits, providing a security level of 190-bits (see Table 12).
Table 12: Cyclotomic CVD families at 192-bit security level with lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q and ρ = 2.
k l deg r i t1 y1 x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
15 30 8 4 3 0 0 mod 2 11520 190
256-bit security level.
For a 256-bit security level, the prime r must be 512-bit large and the extension field must be
13500-bits for prime and 23780-bits for composite embedding degrees. The best possible balance
Table 13: Cyclotomic CVD families at 256-bit security level.
k l deg r i ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
17 34 16 4 1.5625 1 mod 2 13600 256
17 34 16 12 1.5000 1 mod 2 13056 252
19 38 18 12 1.3333 1 mod 2 12971 252
19 38 18 22 1.3889 1 mod 2 13511 256
23 46 22 24 1.1364 1 mod 2 13382 255
25 50 24 6 1.8500 1 mod 2 23680 255
26 26 12 11 1.8333 1 mod 2 24405 258
26 26 12 17 1.7500 1 mod 2 23296 253
27 54 18 2 1.7222 1 mod 2 23808 255
27 54 18 16 1.7778 1 mod 2 24576 258
34 34 16 11 1.3750 1 mod 2 23936 256
38 38 18 11 1.2222 1 mod 2 23780 255
38 38 18 21 1.2778 1 mod 2 24860 260
for the security level in the three pairing groups is obtained by the pairs (k, ρ) = (17, 1.5625),
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(19, 1.3889) and (23, 1.1364) in the prime case. For composite embedding degrees we have an
Table 14: Cyclotomic CVD families at 256-bit security level with lifts t1, y1 ∈ Q and ρ = 2.
k l deg r i t1 y1 x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
13 26 12 2 3 0 0 mod 2 13312 254
optimal balance by the pairs (k, ρ) = (25, 1.8500), (27, 1.7222), (34, 1.3750) and (38, 1.2222).
The rest of the examples in Table 13 also achieve a security level around 256-bits. It is also
possible to get a nicely balanced security level by considering the family of Table 14, for k = 13,
with ρ(p, t, r) = 2.
Non-cyclotomic families.
An alternative approach is to choose the polynomial r(x) to be a non-cyclotomic polynomial,
satisfying condition (2) of Definition 1, in which case we construct non-cyclotomic CVD families.
This setup allows us to obtain examples of families for embedding degrees that we could not
find using the cyclotomic setup of Equation (4.2). As stated when we were discussing complete
families, it is sometimes hard to determine a primitive kth root of unity in Q[x]/〈r(x)〉. In
general, what we have to do is to find a polynomial u(x) ∈ Q[x], such that Φk(u(x)) = 0 mod
r(x). Methods that produce such polynomials r(x) and u(x) can be found in [FK14, KSS08,
LP09, LP12, TN08]. In addition, for CVD families it is also hard to find a polynomial z(x) ≡√−x mod r(x). A general procedure to do this, is to set z(x) ∈ Q[x]/〈r(x)〉 to be of the form:
z(x) = zdeg rx
deg r + zdeg r−1xdeg r−1 + · · ·+ z1x+ z0
and then search for coefficients zi, such that z(x)
2 ≡ −x mod r(x), via an exhaustive search.
Clearly this is a very time consuming process, especially when the degree of the polynomial r(x)
is large (e.g. deg r > 4).
One trick to avoid the above process is to set r(x) = Φl(ax) and u(x) = ax, for some a ∈ Z
and some l ∈ Z>0, such that k | l, but still we need to determine a suitable polynomial z(x).
Such examples are given in Table 15. The family for k = 30 was first introduced in [Dry11]. For
Table 15: Non-cyclotomic CVD families at 128, 192 and 256-bit security.
k l r(x) deg r t(x) z(x) ρ(p, t, r) x0 k log p Lpk [`, c]
12 12 Φ12(2x) 4 2x+ 1 4x
3 + 2x2 − x 1.7500 3 mod 4 5376 139
14 28 Φ28(2x) 12 (2x)
2 + 1 1024x11 + 8x4 1.4167 3 mod 4 5077 136
28 28 Φ28(2x) 12 −(2x)9 + 1 1024x11 + 8x4 1.7500 3 mod 4 25088 261
30 30 Φ30(5x) 8 −(5x)2 + 1 (5x)7 + 2(5x)6 + (5x)5 1.6250 1 mod 2 24960 260
−(5x)4 − (5x)3 − 5x+ 1
k = 28, Dry lo presented a CVD family for the same r(x) as in Table 15, but with ρ(p, t, r) = 1.5.
For a 512-bit prime, this family produces an extension field of size 21504-bits, which is more
than 2000-bits smaller than the optimal size for a 256-bit security level. Using Dry lo’s setup,
we introduce a CVD family with k = 28 and ρ(p, t, r) = 1.75. With this choice we obtain
extension fields of size 25088-bits, which corresponds to a security level of 261-bits according to
the new TNFS attacks for composite embedding degrees. Furthermore, with this setup we also
constructed a family with k = 14 and ρ(p, t, r) = 1.4167, which could not be obtained by the
cyclotomic setup of Equations (4.2).
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In [Dry11], Dry lo presented a non-cyclotomic CVD family with embedding degree 8 and
ρ(p, t, r) = 1.5. This family produces an extension field of 3072-bits, when log r = 256, which
might have been optimal before the improvements of the TNFS method for composite k. Today,
such extension fields reach a security level of 110-bits. Using Dry l’os polynomials r(x) and u(x),
we present our recommendation of a CVD family for k = 8 and ρ(p, t, r) = 2, in the following
example.




(−x3 + 5x2 − 16x+ 2), r(x) = x4 − 4x3 + 8x2 + 8x+ 4, z(x) = 1
4
(−x2 + 2x− 2),
so that z(x)2 ≡ −x mod r(x). Set:
t(x) = −r(x) + u(x), y(x) ≡ [(u(x)− 1)z(x)−1] mod r(x), 4q(x) = t(x)2 + xy(x)2.
We obtain a CVD family with embedding degree 8 and ρ(q, t, r) = 2, which is integer-valued
when x ≡ 23 mod 24.
In Example 9 we actually take a lift t1 = −1 for the trace polynomial t(x), so that the resulting
field polynomial has deg p = 2 deg r. With this CVD family, the extension fields Fp8 have size
around 4096-bits resulting in an 124-bit security level. These are just a few examples of non-
cyclotomic CVD families, but we argue that a lot more can be found by choosing the right
polynomials r(x), u(x) and z(x).
4.2 Numerical Examples
We give our numerical examples obtained by the CVD families of this section in Table 16, for
128, 192 and 256-bit security level. The parameters we constructed are generated by applying
Algorithm 5. The column “x0” refers to the integer input for the polynomials p(x), t(x) and
r(x). Recall that an additional constraint in the case of CVD families is that the integer x0
must be of the form x0 = Dy
2, for some relatively small, positive and square-free D and some
y ∈ Z. This D, hidden in x0 is the CM discriminant and by relatively small, we mean D < 1010
in order to ensure the efficiency of the CM method for constructing elliptic curves. The column
“n” refers to the relaxed condition that r(x0) might contain a small cofactor n, which increases
the probability of finding pairing-friendly elliptic curve triples. In this case we set the prime
r = r(x0)/n. In the final column, we calculate the complexity of the DLP in the extension
field Fpk , using Equation (1.1), for ` = 1/3 and ignoring the constant o(1). For prime k we set
c = 1.923 and for composite k, we set c = 1.526, according to the new variants of the TNFS
attacks [JK16, KB16, EMJ17].
For example we demonstrate how the values in Table 16 are obtained, by explaining the
first line. Recall the CVD family (p(x), t(x), r(x)) with embedding degree 5 and ρ(p, t, r) = 2,
presented in Table 10. We evaluate this family at
x0 = 8871207 · 15114722 ≡ 0 mod 2,
thus the CM discriminant is D = 8871207 and y = 1511472. The corresponding polynomials









with ρ = 1.9961. The prime r is 256-bits and the extension field Fp5 is 2555-bits corresponding
to 128-bit security level, according to Equation (1.1), for ` = 1/3 and c = 1.923. The rest of the
examples in Table 16 are obtained in the same way.
Table 16: Numerical examples of pairing-friendly parameters from selected CVD families.
Source k D x0 n log r k log p ρ Lpk [1/3, c]
Table 10 5 8871207 D · 15114722 ≡ 0 mod 2 1 256 2555 1.9961 128
Table 9 7 9160269 D · 9032 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 256 2674 1.4922 131
Exam 9 8 814127 D · 67272832 ≡ 23 mod 24 9 256 4136 2.0195 125
Table 9 9 908587 D · 29032 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 256 4212 1.8281 126
Table 10 9 4330077 D · 13022 ≡ 0 mod 2 1 256 4590 1.9922 130
Table 9 10 3281749 D · 25756752 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 256 4470 1.7461 129
Table 15 12 4725179 D · 15174432 ≡ 3 mod 4 1 256 5352 1.7422 139
Table 15 14 1350211 D ≡ 3 mod 4 1 256 5040 1.4063 135
Table 11 11 1040779 D · 6112 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 384 6743 1.5964 192
Table 11 13 179 D · 49592 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 384 6630 1.3281 191
Table 12 15 876018 D · 183412 ≡ 0 mod 2 1 384 11550 2.0052 190
Table 12 18 2331871 D · 29497672 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 384 11502 1.6641 190
Table 12 22 87847 D · 20512 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 384 11770 1.3932 192
Table 12 25 87847 D ≡ 1 mod 2 1 384 12925 1.3464 199
Table 12 26 8281427 D · 232 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 384 11596 1.1615 191
Table 14 13 5013326 D · 12032 ≡ 0 mod 2 1 512 13338 2.0039 254
Table 13 17 1971089 D · 472 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 13566 1.5586 256
Table 13 19 2166897 D · 132 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 13471 1.3848 255
Table 13 23 16403 D · 252 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 13340 1.1328 254
Table 13 25 307795 D · 132 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 23650 1.8477 254
Table 13 26 2385911 D · 17352 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 24362 1.8301 258
Table 13 27 2703 D · 3712 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 23760 1.7188 255
Table 15 28 2143411 D · 12912 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 25060 1.7480 260
Table 15 30 4895545 D · 9028732 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 24870 1.6191 259
Table 13 34 3628579 D · 352 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 23902 1.3730 255
Table 13 38 2193243 D · 132 ≡ 1 mod 2 1 512 23712 1.2188 254
Recall that the search for suitable integers x0 is affected by the degree of the polynomial
r(x) and by the size of its leading coefficient, where in the case of CVD families, x0 = Dy
2. In
the examples of Table 16 we have considered CM discriminants D < 107, however we could also
allow it to be slightly larger. Our search is then performed by a random choice of D up to 107
and a random choice of y ∈ Z, such that
deg r (logD + 2 log y) + log(lc(r)) ≈ security level, (4.3)
where lc(r) is the leading coefficient of r(x) (note that lc(r) = 0, when r(x) = Φl(x)). Then we
set x0 = Dy
2. In some case, in order to reach a desired security level, we need y = 1, so that
x0 = D. This happens when the degree of the polynomial r(x) is large. For CVD families at an
128-bit security level we have considered polynomials r(x) with deg r ≤ 10, for 192-bit security
level we have deg r ≤ 20 and for 256-bit security level, deg r ≤ 24.
Remark 10. As stated earlier in this section, a useful advantage of CVD families is that they
allow us to obtain more flexible CM discriminants that the case of complete families, where D
is fixed and relatively small. Throughout the tables in Sections 3 and 4, we see that for many
embedding degrees, complete and CVD families have the same ρ-value. The advantage of the
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CVD families we presented is that the degree of the polynomial r(x) is half the degree of the
corresponding polynomial r(x) for complete families. This allows us to better handle the sizes
of the extracted elliptic curve parameters.
5 Conclusion
Since the recent improvements on variants of the TNFS methods [JK16, KB16, EMJ17] there
has been much speculation on whether pairings can be indeed used for robust cryptographic
applications. Especially for extension fields of composite degree these TNFS attacks have a
major effect causing the necessity to update the criteria for selecting elliptic curve parameters
of composite embedding degree for pairing-based implementations.
Motivated by this necessity, we presented a survey of families of pairing-friendly elliptic
curves with composite embedding degrees, which are likely to generate elliptic curve parameters
resistant to the improved TNFS attacks. As stated throughout this paper, our main concern is
not to search for families with the smallest ρ-values, but for families that produce an equally
balanced security level in the three pairing groups G1,G2 ⊆ E(Fpk) and GT ⊆ F∗pk . Therefore, we
also introduce families with prime embedding degrees, which have not been considered before
due to a larger ρ-value. Additionally, in this paper we are studying to types of polynomial
families. These are complete families (see Section 3), where the CM discriminant is a constant
square-free positive value D and complete with variable discriminant (see Section 4), where the
CM discriminant is represented by a linear term x. We argue that all proposed families are
suitable for producing a balanced security level of 128, 192 and 256-bits in the three pairing
groups. Our recommendations are summarized in Table 17.
Table 17: Recommended complete and CVD families at a 128, 192 and 256-bit security level.
Security Level: 128-bits Security Level: 192-bits Security Level: 256-bits
k ρ k log p k ρ k log p k ρ k log p
5 2.0000 2560 11 1.6000 6758 13 2.0000 13312
7 1.5000 2688 13 1.3333 6656 17 1.5625 13600
8 2.0000 4096 15 2.0000 11520 19 1.3889 13511
9 2.0000 4608 18 1.6667 11520 24 2.0000 24576
10 1.7500 4480 21 1.5000 12096 25 1.8500 23680
12 1.5000 4608 22 1.4000 11827 26 1.8333 24405
14 1.4167 5077 24 1.2500 11520 27 1.7222 23808






The three columns correspond to the three security levels of 128, 192 and 256-bits. In each
column we record the embedding degree k and the ρ-value ρ(p, t, r) achieved by a complete or
CVD family (or both) presented in Sections 3 and 4. For each family we calculate the extension
field size by k log p, where log p = ρ log r and log r is twice the security level. We can then
calculate the asymptotic complexity of the DLP in the extension field Fpk , by Equation (1.1),
i.e. Lpk [1/3, c], where c = 1.923 when k is prime and c = 1.526 when k is composite. Particularly
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